![]() What’s more, if a State’s hands are tied such that it cannot use force to respond to a low-level use of force by an aggressor, it will put pressure on governments to expand what is meant by an “armed attack,” which has potentially dangerous precedential effects in the future. view is that it might enable a government to prevent escalation-for example by using cyber-ops to impede another State’s test missiles-in response to the latter’s low-level uses of force, and thus buy more time for diplomacy to avoid a larger battle. position, one might think, reduces the overall risk of militarized conflicts between States. That’s partly because of the uncertainty of the law in cyberspace and partly because of the uncertainty of facts when cyber operations occur. view in the cyber realm may risk unintended, accidental, and unnecessary militarized conflicts. ![]() There are reasons, however, to think that the application of the U.S. view might have worked well when it came to bombs and battleships. In contrast, the United States has long maintained that a State can use force in self-defense in response to any amount of force by another State. I thought to write up for Just Security, in a more developed form, one of the topics that I raised briefly in my remarks.Ī widely accepted view of the UN Charter is that a State can use force in self-defense only in response to an “armed attack,” which is importantly defined as the gravest forms of force in scale and effects. ![]() Cyber Command’s Legal Conference earlier this week.
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